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Imagination is not a gift usually associated with bureaucracies.
The 9/11 Commission Report, 2002

… nothing is a risk in itself; there is no risk in reality. But, on the other hand, anything
can be a risk; it all depends on how one analyzes the danger, considers the event.
François Ewald, “Insurance and Risk,” 1991

Risk is ambivalence.
Ulrich Beck, “Living in the World Risk Society,” 2006

Introduction
The border is not where it is supposed
to be; the border is getting thicker;
the border “needs a fix.” These are
just a few of the sentiments one
encounters with shocking regularity
when discussing the Canada/US border
in the Pacific Northwest, known as
the Cascade Gateway, or sometimes
referred to as “Cascadia”.1 Generally
unsolicited, these comments and
many others are often vain attempts to
encapsulate the recent changes to this
border, particularly in the post-9/11
epoch. A variety of factors, such as
the demographics of those crossing
the border in the Pacific Northwest,
the current and potential economic
impacts of increased border wait times,
the potential decrease of cross border
travel and commerce, the economic
impact of the Western Hemisphere
Travel Initiative (WHTI), the specific
effect of increased wait times at the
border on regional supply chains,
shared transborder environmental and

resource concerns, and many other
issues have been relatively closely
examined, particularly by leading
researchers supported by the Border
Policy Research Institute.2 Much of this
research is premised on the assumption
that increased wait times, or what is
referred to regularly as a “thickened
border,” is the result of intensified
security measures at the Canada/US
border by officials on both sides of
this historically highly porous frontier.
To put it as simply as possible, this
working paper begins to unpack what
is at the root of contemporary Canada/
US border security: risk management.
Specifically, the analysis highlights
the characteristics of risk management
itself and its near obsession with
quantification, the ramifications of
what has come to be a ubiquitous
reliance on technology in current border
security, and the correlating trend
towards centralizing the management
of border security leading to the
disempowerment of robust stakeholders

Cascadia refers to
a region generally
surrounding the Cascade
Mountain region, but
is often defined more
broadly as Washington,
Oregon, Idaho, Montana
and Alaska on the US
side, and Alberta, British Columbia, and the
Yukon on the Canadian
side. The Pacific Northwest Economic Region
(PNWER) is defined
according to the same 5
US states, 2 Canadian
Provinces and 1 Canadian Territory.
1
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2
See the Border Policy
Research Institutes “Resources” webpage, which
contains a range of up to
date research publications
into many of these matters. http://www.ac.wwu.
edu/~bpri/resources.html.
For a particularly cogent
analysis of the SeattleVancouver corridor and
the shared environmental, commercial, and
cultural concerns, see
James Loucky, Donald K.
Alper and J. C. Day, eds.,
(2008) Transboundary
Challenges in the Pacific
Border Regions of North
America Calgary: University of Calgary Press.
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from the borderlands. As many of these
stakeholders colloquially put it, the
border needs fixing. As of 9/11, central
government authorities in both Canada
and the US, particularly those in the
US Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) agreed. Unfortunately, the
mobilization of a particular notion of
risk management, an increasing reliance
on technology and the assumptions and
provisions that accompany that, and
moves to centralize the border security
function, have led attempts by DHS and
the Canadian counterparts to be at odds
with those who are now lamenting over
the mismanagement of the Canada/
US border. Rather than provide a fix, I
unpack and problematize contemporary
border security strategies, specifically
risk management, and highlight the
extent to which they are at least partly
responsible for contemporary problems
and inefficiencies with the management
of the Canada/US border, specifically in
the Cascade Gateway.
This analysis begins from the assertion
that contemporary Canada/US border
security – led by the initiative of the
US and generally closely followed by
Canadian counterparts – is advanced
by the Risk Management (RM) model.
Drawing on contemporary literature,
notably Aradau and van Munster’s
pivotal argument on “governing
through risk” (Aradau and van Munster
2007), I contend that more than
simply adopting RM as the principal
strategy for managing border security,

officials have come to “govern through
risk” at the Canada/US border. The
paper considers the ramifications
of this move, considering the (in)
appropriateness of RM as a strategy for
the provision of public security, and
specifically border security, but also
reflects on three noted trends directly
associated with “governing through
risk” at the Canada/US border: first, the
quantification of security and risk and
the subsequent “zero risk” approach;
second, and intimately related to the
first trend, the technologization of
security; and finally, the third trend is
the centralization of authority. However,
for this analysis the disempowerment of
robust stakeholders in the borderlands,
which is the correlating outcome of this
centralization, is what is of interest. These
three trends in contemporary border
security raise critical considerations
regarding a range of issues akin to BrunetJailly and Dupeyron’s fundamental
two elements of security at/in borders
and borderlands: “human activities
(the agency and agent of power of
individual ties and forces spanning the
border); and second, the broader social
processes that frame individual action,
such as market forces, government
activities, and regional culture and
politics of a borderland” (Brunet-Jailly
and Dupeyron 2007: 1).
It deserves mention that this
working paper stands as the initial
report upon research and investigation
that will culminate in a forthcoming
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monograph, Security, Risk, and the
Biometric State: Governing Borders and
Bodies, to be published in the PRIO
New Security Series with Routledge
in 2009. This forthcoming text begins
with much of the analysis provided in
this working paper with regard to the
application and implications of using
RM strategies in contemporary border
security, specifically in terms of the
technologization of security that follows
from it. The monograph takes greater
pains to unpack the ramifications of
the technologization of security at the
border, in particular the reliance upon
and almost fetishization of biometrics,
and the related consequences to how
borders and bodies are governed,
understood, experienced, read, etc.,
and the general proliferation of borders
and bordering practices throughout
contemporary politics. Underlying the
analysis throughout this working paper
and the forthcoming monograph is the
notion that the burgeoning reliance
on a range of surveillance technologies
is motivated by the reliance on RM
and the general model of “governing
through risk,” and it contributes
directly to a series of problems with
and radical changes to how borders
operate, are experienced, are assumed
to be secure, as well as accompanying
alterations to the manner in which
the bodies crossing these borders
are perceived, read, managed, and
governed. Finally, the obvious point is
that these transformations are not only
significant at the border and throughout

the borderlands, but are the source of
ramifications that are far reaching.
The forthcoming monograph frames
these developments using three key
insights about contemporary politics:
the ubiquity of borders and bordering
practices; the centrality of biometric
technological thinking; and, the widescale adoption of the risk-governance
mentality (termed ‘governmentality’
in the academic literature) within a
framework of exceptional sovereignty
and the global war on terror. Although
clearly developing these insights is
beyond the scope of a working paper,
I nonetheless raise them here to
emphasize and cast a light on this
backdrop, as it is a milieu from which
the assertions made in this working
paper emerge.
On the efficacy of borders, the resilience
and importance of borderlands, and
the permeability of borders, there is a
relatively sound literature. Although
these issues are pertinent to the
analysis at hand, a narrow focus on a
specific sort of border security and/or
border management and its broader
ramifications to the aforementioned
fields is of interest here. Furthermore,
before engaging directly with the
tripartite issues of quantification,
technologization, and liberty/security,
which follow from the move to “govern
through risk” at the border, the argument
requires some deliberation on a notion
most prevalent in such discussion, and
unfortunately so often misunderstood,
that of “securitization.”
3
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Securitization and
Governing through Risk
at the border: “All that
is fluid solidifies”
Since September 11th, references
to “securitization” have proliferated.
In what appears to be a never ending
move towards the “securitization
of everything,” references to the
insecurity of transportation, borders,
financial institutions, a burgeoning
“critical infrastructure,” and a host of
other critical portions of our modern
liberal information society are made
in the news media, by politicians
and bureaucrats. As the potential,
necessary,
and/or
long
overdue
“securitization” of various sectors is
raised, it is a discourse of insecurity and
not security that is invoked. To claim,
for example, that a border is porous is
on the one hand to accept the general
operation and function of a border for
time immemorial; as a line crossed,
regularly by those in borderlands,
and far less so by those from distant
lands, and a signification of some
form of authority, in some cases, state
sovereignty. The alternative, however,
is to express the permeability of the
border as not integral to transboundary
communities, international commerce
and trade, the integrity of a borderland’s
cultural, political and socio-economic
resiliency, but as something dangerous,
threatening, and potentially risky.
Drawing on the critical theory tradition,
the first point to be gleaned is the
absolute necessity of asking the “how
4

possible” question of securitization.
In other words, how is it possible
that particular issues are labeled as
security issues, by whom, and in whose
interests? In the case of border security,
a critical question becomes that of outsourcing of surveillance infrastructures,
ID card systems, biometrics, and so on,
and the extent to which the security
professionals responsible for providing
these systems – or what Bigo and others
have termed “managers of unease”
– construct the field of risk itself (see
Salter 2008a, 2008b). In other words,
once opened up, security professionals
have the ability to not only provide
security solutions, but also frame the
necessity of certain solutions in such a
way as to characterize and even define
the risk itself. The use of biometrics,
forms of CCTV surveillance, and ID
Card systems, in presenting themselves
as solutions or mitigation strategies,
make powerful assumptions about risk:
what/who the potential risks might
be, and how these threats are likely to
operate/behave.
This brief comment picks up on a
particular notion of “securitization” that
has emerged among scholars in the field
of critical security studies. The breadth
of “securitization” approaches is too
grand to fully engage here; however,
it is worth noting that in many cases,
and indeed in this working paper,
references to “securitization” connote
far more than what the early theorists
of this approach referred to as “speech
acts.” That is to say, when considering

Governing
through Risk at the
Canada/US Border:
Liberty, Security,
Technology
Benjamin J. Muller, Ph.D.

the securitization of the Canada/US
border, for example, the analysis that
follows reflects on deeper questions of
constructing the issue of security, taking
note of the actors involved, and the
broader social processes that frame and
are affected by this move, as opposed
to simply noting how a particular issue
area comes to be referred to as a security
issue. This particular understanding of
securitization, referred to by some as the
Paris School (C.A.S.E. Collective 2006),
fits well with the notion of “Governing
through Risk.”
In their article on “Governing through
Risk,” Aradau and van Munster (2007)
develop a notion of “precautionary
risk.” Drawing from the work of Ulrich
Beck and others, the notion that certain
risks (“manufactured risks”) do not come
from outside, as external risks do, but
are “manufactured by the very impact
of our developing knowledge about
the world” (Ceyhan 2008: 105). Unlike
simple external risks, manufactured
risks, such as environmental, health,
nuclear, etc., are not tied to our ability
to calculate them, since we cannot
and do not know the real level of risk
(Ceyhan 2008: 105). As the quotation
from François Ewald that headed this
paper asserts, nothing is a risk in and of
itself, but rather, it depends on how the
evaluation of danger and the context
and circumstances is made (see Ewald
1991). Similarly, Beck and others refer
to such risks as incalculable risks; risks
that are uncertain or even considered
to be “intentional catastrophes,” like

terrorism (see Beck 2006). Aradau and
van Munster’s notion of “precautionary
risk” is precisely getting at this limitation
of risk thinking, and thus represents an
attempt at prevention, taming the limit,
monitoring, managing, and governing
the ungovernable and the uncertain
(Aradau and van Munster 2007: 107).
Still others have connected this to a
preemptory logic that is embedded in
such attempts to “manage uncertainty”
and “govern the ungovernable” (De
Goede 2008a, 2008b), which is precisely
how the task of contemporary border
security has been framed: mobility
itself becomes potentially threatening
(see Packer 2006) as the porosity of
borders is assumed away in a reversal
of the Marxian dictum, “all that is solid
melts into air” and all that is fluid and
porous solidifies.
To simply note that “governing
through risk” is an influential force
behind the institutions charged
with securing the border tells us very
little. The prevalence of RM strategies
in contemporary border security is
ubiquitous. Just months after 9/11,
the signing of the “Smart Border
Declaration” in December 2001, and
the subsequent Smart Border Accord,
which is responsible for inspiring many
of the current border security strategies
such as NEXUS and WHTI, expressed a
strong commitment to RM. Similarly,
“Secure
Flight”
and
“Passenger
Protect,” the respective American
and Canadian “no fly list” programs,
are heavily motivated by the logic of
5
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RM. Indeed, even the thinking behind
the more substantial Security and
Prosperity Partnership (SPP) is clearly
not untouched by the logic of RM.
Moving towards specifics, the Canadian
government is itself not totally happy
with the performance of the relatively
newly created Canada Border Services
Agency (CBSA), citing that it “lacks
an
integrated
risk
management
framework”
(Standing
Committee
on Public Accounts 2008). Although
the statement suggests the CBSA
has not successfully integrated a risk
management framework, it underscores
the
commitment
to
“governing
through risk” by their political masters.
The account forwarded here does not
engage in the specific instances of
applied RM in contemporary border
security, nor is there an attempt in this
analysis to provide a scale or continuum
upon which one can judge more or less
effective applications of RM. The general
logic of governance that accompanies
the employment of RM is of interest, as
is the extent to which its efficacy can
or cannot actually be measured. Rather
than critique RM as a strategy in general,
the focus here is to critically question
its application in Canada/US border
security. RM may indeed be sound as
an approach to governance for a whole
range of reasons, however, in dealing
with so-called “incalculable risks” or
uncertainties, or what Aradau and
van Munster label “taming the limit,”
its strategy, method, and utility are in

6

question. If, as Beck contends, “risk is
ambivalence,” one would never know
it from the ubiquitous calculations,
measurements, and numbers that
are
literally
hemorrhaging
from
contemporary security professionals
to rationalize their tactics, justify their
costs, and valorize their efforts.

The “Risk” of
Quantification
The alleged necessity of enhancing
border security verges on prosaic in the
post-9/11 context. Although a number
of issues were flagged by, among others,
The 9/11 Commission Report, border
security seemed to progress to the head
of the class overnight. Bolstered by
catastrophic thinking often forwarded
in popular accounts such as Stephen
Flynn’s America the Vulnerable, the
securitization of the Canada/US border
was quickly underway. Specifically, as
part of the institutional restructuring
under the newly formulated DHS, the
institutional management of the border
followed suit, and Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) was created. As with
many other post-9/11 developments
particularly (and for some obvious
reasons in the case of border security,
being that the border itself is shared),
Canada followed the US lead, creating
the CBSA. In both cases, the management
of the border shifted from one focused
on customs collections to an obsession
with security. Charged with securing the
border, these new institutions quickly
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found themselves at odds with massive
amounts of commercial, leisure, and
tourist traffic that crosses the Canada/
US border on a daily basis. The US
Department of Transportation regularly
finds itself in a difficult position, a
department of the government and thus
interested in state security by definition,
and yet it is charged with enhancing the
flow of goods, services, people, etc., even
across borders and through airports.
These contrasting ambitions are yet
unresolved. The extent to which border
agencies need likewise be concerned
with more than simply securing the
border is abundantly apparent on a daily
basis across the length of the Canada/US
border. How then can the security of the
border be enhanced while maintaining
the imperatives of relatively efficient
and timely border crossing for goods
and services? ‘Properly executed’ RM
techniques are believed to be the answer
to this dilemma.3 Unfortunately, the
nature of RM presents some problems
when applied to border security, both
in terms of the underlying logic and its
method.
Since its origins are in the insurance
industry,
RM
continues
to
be
commonplace throughout that arena.
Risks such as potential flooding, fires,
and vandalism, to name a few, are
quantified and measured in terms of
low to high risk, primarily on the basis
of the assessed potential frequency and
impact of such risks. There are statistics
on fires, it is clear that certain materials

are more flammable than others, low
lying areas are more prone to flooding,
etc. When applied to so-called “acts of
God” natural disasters, or in the case of
this analysis, potential terrorism, there
is clearly a deep problem associated
with quantifying the risk. As Salter has
eloquently put it, we are in the space of
“imaginary numbers” at this point. The
importance of “imagination” cannot be
over-emphasized, as preparation for the
risks that fall into the category of the
ungovernable or uncertain have little if
any data upon which the quantification
can be based, and thus are premised to
a much greater degree on what is often
referred to as “catastrophic thinking.”
The Pacific Northwest Economic Region,
for example, conducts a program called
“Blue Cascades,” in which a potential
catastrophe is imagined, and scenarios
and simulations are worked out as a
mode of preparation. Once imagined,
one must then engage in a “risk
assessment,” wherein the frequency
and impact of the risk is measured.
The potential problems associated
with the use of RM in border security
can be divided into two categories:
the first is associated with the use of
RM itself in terms of its strategies and
assessment techniques; the second is
linked to creating resiliency through
redundancy, and what is termed here
as “The redundancy problematic.” The
analysis begins with an overview of
RM, considering briefly its genealogy.
As a part of new public management

The paradoxical relationship between security
and the imperatives of
mobility is most obvious
in the case of the virtual
border(s) at the airport.
Although airport security has been dramatically heightened in the
post-9/11 environment,
and as a point of entry it
acts as a “virtual border,”
with regards to passenger
prescreening in airports,
one of the primary measures of success for both
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
and the Canadian Transport Security Authority
(CATSA) is how quickly
passengers are processed
through security checks.
3
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techniques, RM has emerged as a
ubiquitous strategy across much of
the contemporary public and private
sectors. Much of the attraction of RM
strategies relates to their seeming utility
as a method for rationalizing increased
resource allocation to particular sectors
under conditions of resource scarcity
and increased demands on government.
A significant problem with this is the
reliance on quantification in RM, and the
extent to which success and/or failure is
quantified. In the case of border security,
as Table 1 from Salter’s (2008b) analysis
of RM and quantification indicates,
measuring false positives is difficult if
not impossible unless these errors result
in a catastrophic failure, such as Richard
Reid (“The Shoe Bomber”), or the death
of Robert Dziekanski at Vancouver
airport (discussed later), which causes
subsequent institutional changes and
adaptations to the risk assessment. In
other words, one has no way of knowing
how many people are crossing the border
with contraband, weapons, etc., unless
they are used in such a way that it results
in some sort of catastrophe. Similarly,
no records are kept of how many false
negatives occur, which in security terms
may be of little relevance, yet in terms
of the efficiency and effectiveness of

border security are of great import. In
the case of the Canada/US border in
the Cascade Gateway, for example,
vehicles and passengers are regularly
subject to more in-depth checks by both
Canadian and American officials, often
to no end. The argument can be made
that such random interrogation acts as
a deterrence, but the counter-argument
that this is simply inconveniencing
honest travelers who are without
contraband and who do not pose any
serious security threat is equally valid,
as neither argument can be proven with
any certainty or statistical measure.
Providing meaningless measurements
of such matters, or simply failing to
compile such statistics, is precisely what
Salter refers to as “imaginary numbers.”
In order to underscore the problem
with RM in terms of its reliance on
quantification for rationalizing increased
resource allocation and specifically
measuring success or failure of the
security approaches used, the anecdote
of Robert Dziekanski in Vancouver
International Airport in October 2007 is
particularly instructive.
On 13 October 2007, a flight arrived at
Vancouver International Airport (YVR)
at approximately 3:15 pm. A middleaged construction worker from Poland,

Table 1 – Security Screening
Positive: presence of prohibited item,
detection, “stop” decision

False Positive: presence of prohibited item,
no detection, “go decision”

Negative: no presence of prohibited item,
no detection, “go” decision

False Negative: no presence of prohibited
item, detection, “stop” decision

(Salter 2008b: 256).
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Robert Dziekanski, was aboard this
flight, with the intent of immigrating
from Poland to live with his mother
in Kamloops, British Columbia. Upon
completing initial customs clearance,
Mr. Dziekanski was referred to secondary
immigration processing. It was already
clear that Mr. Dziekanski was unable to
speak English, as he required assistance
in the initial processing. It was also
obvious that he was under some duress,
noted by airport staff, as he was pale
and sweating. Between 4:00 pm and
10:45 pm, Mr. Dziekanski’s precise
whereabouts are unclear. However,
he was in a secure area of the airport,
which he could not leave without
proper documentation, and interviews
done after the fact indicate that he was
milling around the luggage carousels
during this period. It should be noted
that this is a secure area of the airport.
During this period, Mr. Dziekanski’s
mother, who was waiting in the public
arrivals area of the airport, asked
about the whereabouts of her son, but
without appropriate flight information,
she received little information and was
told he had not arrived. Assuming he
missed the flight, his mother left for
Kamloops. At approximately 10:45 pm,
Mr. Dziekanski attempted to leave the
secure customs hall area and was again
referred to secondary immigration
for processing. After finding some
missing bags that contained necessary
immigration information and finally
completing secondary processing, Mr.
Dziekanski was free to go at 12:15 am.

After sitting for another 30 minutes in the
customs hall, Mr. Dziekanski was asked
by airport officials to leave the secure area
and move to the international arrivals
reception area at YVR. Mr. Dziekanski
became increasingly agitated, propped
the doors between the secure customs
hall and the arrivals reception area open
with a chair, and threw a small table
and computer to the ground. The Royal
Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) were
called by airport officials at this point,
and upon arriving asked an agitated Mr.
Dziekanksi to move up against a wall in
the secure customs hall area where Mr.
Dziekanski was waiting. Approximately
25-30 seconds after arrival, the RCMP
officers decided to deploy the use of
the Taser, an electroshock weapon,4
and after tackling Mr. Dziekanski to
the ground officers chose to Taser Mr.
Dziekanski once more. As a result of the
Taser, Mr. Dziekanski tragically died at
the scene. There is a reasonable amount
of precision regarding the timeline and
facts of this incident, in part because
the event has been the subject of a
public inquiry into the use of Tasers by
law enforcement, and in part because
a member of the public captured the
final moments of Mr. Dziekanski’s life,
including the Tasering by RCMP, on
video which was subsequently shown
on the internet and the national and
international news media.
Aside from the obvious tragic death
of Mr. Dziekanski, and some serious
questions regarding the use of Tasers by
law enforcement officers, there are a series

The use of the Taser is
premised on the argument that it is considered
to be a non-lethal form
of restraint that is to be
used by special trained
police officers in place of
lethal force. The Taser is
an electroshock weapon
that is intended to
incapacitate the neuromuscular system through
involuntary contractions and stimulations.
Tasers use approximately
50,000 to 100,000 volts
to incapacitate the victim. While marketed as
non-lethal, the number
of lethal incidents and
proliferation of inquiries
into its use and moratoriums suggest its lethality
remains open to debate.
4
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Not only was the
creation of the CBSA
scrutinized, but the decision to arm CBSA staff
was highly contentious,
both in terms of objections rooted in Canadian
political culture and identity and the perspective
on firearms, but arguably
more importantly from
the RCMP itself, which
is most clearly evident
in the Canadian Customs and Excise Union
(CEUDA) Submission to
the Standing Committee
on National Security and
Defense discussion of Bill
C-26: An Act to Establish
the Canadian Border
Services Agency.
5
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of critically important issues regarding
the use of RM in border security, as well
as some complications associated with
the management of virtual borders in
the modern airport. As a point of entry,
the airport is by definition a virtual
(or biometric) border (also see Muller
2008b). While this particular incident
ended in tragedy, there is no real way
of knowing how often people are able
to loiter unaccounted for in the secure
customs hall in the airport, since such
figures are not kept and would indeed
be incredibly difficult to obtain. This
situation also underscores some of the
problems associated with the strategy
RM provides, when applied to areas
of public security, or in this case,
specifically border security. While RM
provides four options when faced with
risk – accept, mitigate, avoid, transfer –
the reality is that one, and at best two
of these strategies, are not only the
sole desirable options when confronted
with risks in public security, but they
are indeed the only possible options.
The incident involving Mr. Dziekanski
highlights not only the extent to which
the complexity of overlapping and
unclear lines of authority at the virtual
border makes the transfer of risk possible
– that is, let’s say from the CBSA in this
instance to the RCMP – but also the
extent to which accepting the risk and
possibly mitigating it, are in fact the
only real options. Avoiding it is simply
not rational for the provision of public
security, and even transferring the risk
only contributes to institutional and

inter-departmental power struggles,
uncertainties, and incongruities, thus
not providing increased public security.
As this specific case indicates, those
lines of authority and authorization
are unclear. Although the management
of the border has changed vis-à-vis
institutional transformation from one
of simply customs, excise, and to a
lesser extent, an immigration and visa
regime, towards a far greater emphasis
on security (including, even, arming
the CBSA at great cost to the Canadian
taxpayer), the efficacy of this decision
is unclear in light of this particular
case. When confronted with what was
assessed at the time as a security risk, or
one might even say a security breach, the
new and reinvigorated CBSA, designed
to manage and most importantly
secure “the border,” was shown to
be rather impotent and relied on
traditional institutional arrangements
to deal with the situation.5 Thus, the
mismanagement
and
subsequent
death of Robert Dziekanski highlights
not only the general impossibility of
quantifying certain failures with border
security – and subsequently indicates
that claims of success are speculative –
but also raises serious doubts about the
efficacy of the RM approach itself when
applied in the realm of public security,
and specifically, border security. The
close relationship and even correlative
association between the reliance on RM
and the subsequent technologization
of contemporary border security is also
worth noting.
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Technologization:
The Emerging Biometric
Border
As RM emerges as the dominant model
of security, the thirst for quantification
that accompanies it contributes directly
to the technologization of border
security. Put simply, technology has itself
become the centerpiece of contemporary
security systems (see Ceyhan 2008). As
Salter notes, by imposing biometric
passports on foreigners who seek
entry into the United States, the US
administration contributed directly to
the transformation of biometrics into a
global security norm (Salter 2006; also
see Ceyhan 2008). Both institutional
changes to the border agencies in
Canada and the US, as well as the
increasing reliance on surveillance and
technological means of prescreening –
which is presented as an effective means
for pre-assessing risk – have dramatically
changed how the border functions and
is experienced by those crossing it, and
have likewise dramatically altered the
landscape of influential stakeholders
involved in the management of the
border. The material design of the
border itself is significant, insofar as
it contributes to freer movement for
those voluntarily enrolled in trusted
or registered traveler schemes, such as
NEXUS.6 Together with the institutional
transition from customs enforcement
towards a security function, the
border moves away from a visa/
passport/immigration regime towards

a surveillance regime that is less tied
to geography. Although these changes
are considered to a far greater extent
elsewhere,7 some brief commentary is
needed here, as it is a crucial part of the
puzzle in terms of the transformation
of the Canada/US Border, materially,
institutionally, and “bodily.”
The
transformation
and/or
securitization
of
the
Canada/US
border, in this case specifically in the
Cascade Gateway, owe much to the
increasing reliance on technology.
The increasing use of surveillance
techniques, biometrics vis-à-vis both
the US VISIT system and NEXUS, as
well as the relatively less secure and
more controversial Radio Frequency
Identification (RFID) technology in
the enhanced BC/Washington State
driver’s license pilot (which is also
present in NEXUS), has changed how
the border functions, as well as how
it is experienced by those crossing.8 In
much the same way as “no fly lists”
function, NEXUS (and the commercial
equivalent, FAST) and other such
programs extend the border outwards,
(i.e., cause a proliferation of borders, as
opposed to a thickening of the sovereign
border), enabling a pre-assessment of
risk far before one physically crosses
the border. In the case of virtual borders
in airports, pre-assessment is far easier,
due to the necessary reliance on travel
agencies or online ticket booking
services, and commercial airlines. In
sharp contrast, aside from registered

6
It should be noted that
the Enhanced Drivers
License (EDL) is not a
trusted traveler program,
but simply a registered
system. For example, being convicted of a felony
will not in and of itself
prevent one from obtaining an EDL.

7
See Muller 2008b; Epstein 2007; Amoore 2006.

8
On problems with the
enhanced drivers license
scheme and the reliance
on RFID technology, see
Testimony of Sophia
Cope, Staff Attorney/Ron
Plesser Fellow, Center for
Democracy and Technology, Before Senate
Committee On Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee
on Oversight of Government Management, the
Federal Workforce, and
the District of Columbia,
on The Impact of Implementation: A Review of
the REAL ID Act and
the Western Hemisphere
Travel Initiative, Tuesday
April 29, 2008.
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See note 8.
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traveler programs, there is currently no
method to pre-assess risk at the land
border, as those wishing to cross it are
by in large relying on personal modes
of transportation, and thus not entering
any existing transportation networks
which might facilitate screening, other
than bus or train travel. Unfortunately,
as the experience with the commercial
registered traveler program, FAST, has
shown, due in large part to the desire
to securitize the entire supply chain,
registration and pre-assessing risk can
force almost crippling administrative
burdens on to the users, making such
measures relatively ineffective, due to
the complexity of the pre-assessment
and the ensuing cost and inconvenience.
On the subject of cost, there is little
if any public consultation regarding
the use of certain technologies. Aside
from privacy concerns and the like, the
monetary costs deserve debate. The lack
of discussion over such matters raises
serious concern over what Didier Bigo
and others have referred to as “managers
of unease” (Bigo 2002; Leander 2005).
As with the use of private contractors
in Iraq, or the decision to use
particular ID card schemes in various
national contexts (see Bennett and
Lyon 2008), the relationship between
the providers of the technology and
related commercial interests and the
decision makers themselves is often
far too close for comfort, which raises
serious concerns about what or whose
“security” these schemes actually serve.

As Leander has effectively noted in the
case of private security contractors, these
actors gain the capacity to construct
specific articulations of security and
insecurity to their own advantage.
In the case of border security, similar
issues of concern arise when security
technology providers gain prominence.
Certainly the lack of information
surrounding specifics about the pilot
program for a joint BC-Washington
enhanced driver’s license does not leave
even the most casually curious observer
void of suspicion.9 Together, these
issues further underscore the extent
to which the capacity, control, and
effective authority/authorization over
the contemporary management of the
Canada/US border by the borderlands
has been continuously eroded.

Liberty, Security, and the
Disempowerment of the
Borderlands
Although skeptical of Brunet-Jailly’s
claim that in both North America
and the European Union borders and
borderlands are not unique, many of
my findings echo his specific assertions
regarding borderlands and border
security. In particular, the relative
failure of border security strategies
premised on a specific articulation of
the relationship between liberty and
security that has been employed vis-àvis RM in a top-down manner follows
Brunet-Jailly’s argument. Although in
the specific case of the Cascade Gateway,
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and indeed in the majority of Canada/
US border security, there is a reasonable
amount of transnational institutional
awareness and cooperation, there yet
remains a severe lack of awareness and/
or underestimation of the efficacy of
borderlands, the stakeholders therein,
and the import of cultural, economic,
social, and political exchange that
constitutes the borderlands. Staying
momentarily
with
Brunet-Jailly’s
analysis of border security, it would
seem that in the Cascade Gateway
border region, in addition to the cited
problems with operationalizing border
security, Brunet-Jailly’s two hypotheses
of borderland security are currently at
odds with one another:
Hypothesis (1): the MORE culture,
political clout, and market forces are
INTEGRATED, the MORE POROUS
THE BORDERLAND
Hypothesis (2): the MORE the policy
activities of multiple governments
are INTEGRATED, the LESS POROUS
THE BORDERLAND
(Brunet-Jailly 2007: 355)
Although Hypothesis 1 provides
a
reasonable
representation
of
borderlands in the Cascade Gateway
pre-9/11, subsequent securitization and
even militarization10 of the border has
definitely attempted to decrease the
porosity of the border in the Pacific
Northwest. In the case of the Cascade
Gateway, the deep integration of

market, culture, and political forces is
uncontestable. However, particularly
since 9/11, the integration (or at times
policy isomorphism, at times under
pressure) between Canadian and
American border policy has increased.
Therefore, to continue with BrunetJailly’s dual hypotheses, it would seem
that in the contemporary context of
the Canada/US border in the Pacific
Northwest, the integration of policy is
rising while the already well integrated
cultural, political, and market forces
resist the resulting securitization of/at
the border.
The primary focus of the analysis
presented here is on the employment of
RM in the contemporary securitization
of the Canada/US border, and the
subsequent technologization of security
that follows. However, having spent
a number of months at the Border
Policy Research Institute (BPRI) at
Western Washington University in
Bellingham, Washington, has made me
acutely aware of the plethora of active
and capable local stakeholders in this
rich borderland region. Taking part in
the International Mobility and Trade
Corridor Project (IMTC) hosted by the
Whatcom Council of Governments, or
being made more aware of the work of
the Pacific Northwest Economic Region,
not to mention the close collaboration
and support the BPRI receives from and
provides to these coalitions of actors,
underscores the effectiveness, capacity,
and increasing frustration of these

It should be noted that
the use of “militarization” can simply connote
the use of military equipment such as unmanned
aerial drones, apache helicopters, etc. in border security, but it also suggests
that actual definition of
security and insecurity
at the border becomes
articulated in military
terms by the military.
The latter portion of this
term is debatable in this
specific case, however, the
increased use of military
hardware and (para)
military tactics in the
management of the border is far more evident.
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key stakeholders in the borderlands.
Victim of a rather narrow set of political
objectives, contemporary US homeland
security, and border security specifically,
has succumbed to the securitizing
and centralizing post-9/11 trends.
The interests of cultural, political and
market factors with long standing
histories of cross border collaboration
and cooperation in borderlands have
been neglected, ignored, or in the most
nefarious reading of the situation,
intentionally
disempowered.
The
reliance on RM strategies in border
security leads almost inevitably to a
“zero risk” approach to border security.
While the ramifications of such an
approach are widespread, it acts most
acutely to the detriment of the long
standing trans-border cultural, political,
and market relations that make the
borderland so robust.

as an approach to border security and
to increased institutional funding and
redesign is clear, and the correlating
technologization of security is evident.
My particular interest here is to
critically question the appropriateness
of the RM model for border security,
and the extent to which, as a package,
the centralization of authority, reliance
on RM, and technologization of
contemporary border security has failed
to tap into, or indeed maligned, the
resources, knowledge, expertise, and
experience of the borderlands, which
in the Pacific Northwest have a proven
track record. As a result, I conclude with
a series of summary points and modest
recommendations:
•

Conclusions
In conclusion, I wish to underscore
the extent to which this working paper
is intended to set the groundwork
for further investigation and research
in a range of areas, some of which I
explicitly engage in my forthcoming
monograph. The intention is to raise
a series of issues associated with the
situation at the Canada/US border
in the Cascade Gateway, particularly
in terms of post-9/11 security
enhancements. By disassembling the
contemporary securitization of the
Canada/US border, the reliance on RM
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•

There is a serious need to
critically assess both the utility
and appropriateness of the RM
approach in the area of border
security. The methods it provides
are not necessarily compatible with
the specifics of border security, and
public security more generally,
and as a way of measuring success
or failure in the actual security
function it is flawed. Not least
among reservations one might
have towards the use of RM for
border security, is the propensity
– in part vis-à-vis the centrality of
quantification – towards a “zero
risk” tolerance.
Although the use of a range of
technologies is indeed appropriate
in various aspects of border
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•

security, such as biometrics in
trusted traveler programs like
NEXUS, the extent to which it
has been treated as a panacea
and an end in itself requires
increased scrutiny. In particular,
not only does the extent to which
certain technologies are perceived
as security ends in themselves
deserve critical reflection, but
two further issues require serious
consideration: the extent to
which the introduction of and
subsequent reliance on technology
leads to the creation of an
additional critical infrastructure
which itself needs securing, and
thus is the source of increased
insecurity; and, the specific role
of technology providers and their
capacity to frame, construct,
and/or articulate security and
insecurity (i.e. the assessed risk
and/or threat) in contemporary
border security.
Finally,
an
increased
acknowledgement of, and one
would hope, a subsequent (re)
empowerment of the borderlands
and
the
range
of
active
stakeholders therein is an absolute
necessity for any truly successful
long term strategy at Canada/
US border security. Perhaps most
importantly, the decision to
pursue this strategy would not
only reframe the relationship
between liberty and security as it

is represented by federal agencies
such as the DHS, but would also
open up the opportunity for
novel solutions to contemporary
border security problems, for
which there is precedent, and
the potential for a more effective
and far reaching public relations/
education campaign in order
to educate citizens, particularly
those in the borderlands, of
current changes to the border,
the uses of technology, and so
on. Enabling and empowering
these stakeholders holds promise
in dealing constructively with the
dilemma of increasing security
without decreasing the beneficial
porosity of the border. A further
desirable move would require
opening up the management
of
the
Canada/US
border,
particularly in regions like the
Cascade Gateway, to interested
citizens and stakeholders for
public consultation, in order that
those whose lives, livelihood, and
indeed identities are most affected
by the border have a direct say in
the management of that border.
Unfortunately, all trends since
9/11 have been in the opposite
direction, centralizing control and
authority and disempowering the
borderlands.
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